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Abstract
This paper discusses the key hypotheses which Joseph Stiglitz proposed, in his wide-ranging
critique of the ‘Washington Consensus’, with regard to transition reforms and economic polices
in China and Russia.  The primary purpose is to evaluate the Stiglitz perspective in the light of
empirical evidence, including the experience of countries outside China and Russia.  Although
some of the points Stiglitz makes are important for understanding what has happened in the
transition, this paper argues that his perspective mis-interprets the key facts of the Chinese
transition, mis-describes the facts of the Russian transition and fails to consider the theoretical
and policy implications of the success of a “third model”, which is represented by some
Central European and Baltic transitions.
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1.  Introduction
That the transition from communism is largely over can be seen in the fact that the battle over
its historical interpretation has begun1.  An early salvo in this battle has been fired by Joseph
Stiglitz (1999a and 1999b), at the time Senior Vice-President of the World Bank, in a
blistering attack aimed at both the Washington consensus (of the IMF, World Bank and US
Treasury) which, he claims, foisted tragically mistaken policies on the countries emerging
from communism, and at unnamed ‘western advisers’ who misunderstood both the true
nature of capitalism and the nature of the reform process.  Furthermore, Stiglitz contrasts two
models of transition.  On the one hand, he says, is China, where institutional reform has been
gradual, building on already existing solutions, and economic growth has been rapid.  On the
other, there is Central Europe (CE) and the former Soviet Union (fSU), above all Russia,
where reformers and their western advisers, both institutional and personal, organised a
‘blitzkrieg’ on existing economic structures, pursuing a ‘clean slate’ policy by which they
tried to “engineer...the new, clean, and pure ‘textbook institutions’ of a private economy.”
Some western advisers were just bolsheviks ‘a rebours’, only “using the right textbooks this
time” (or so they believed).  The result has been a massive fall in economic activity2.  This
occurred, says Stiglitz, partly because superficial modern economics textbooks informed the
thinking of the advisers, rather than the deeper and more subtle Austrian approaches of
Hayek and Schumpeter, or more advanced and rigorous modern journal articles of such
authors as Stiglitz himself.
We do not feel directly targeted by this criticism, for although we have all been
advisers (and one of us has been also a decision maker) during the transition, we are all East
European.  Moreover, we believe that some of the points Stiglitz makes are important for
understanding what has happened in the transition (and indeed what occurred during the
development of capitalism in West).  This is particularly the case when he points, in the
context of corporate governance, to the impossibility of quickly building “long agency
chains”.  However, we shall argue that the picture Stiglitz paints of the transition is
fundamentally flawed in three key respects:
1. His misinterpretation of the facts of the Chinese transition
2. His misdescription of the facts of the Russian transition
3. His failure to consider the implications of the success of the “third model”,
which is represented by some Central European and Baltic transitions
(particularly the Estonian, Hungarian and Polish).
                                                
1 We speak here of the transition from communism, not of the transition to capitalism.  It is clearly not the case
that all the post-Communist countries have become, or will inevitably become, normal and successful capitalist
market economies.  But it is now fairly clear which ones will succeed in achieving this in the foreseeable future
and which ones will not, and what kind of system has developed in each.
2 Probably the largest in peacetime in modern history, as we all agree.
2The result of these flaws is a deep misunderstanding of the real choices open to decision
makers in Russia at the beginning of the 1990s, and therefore a profound misinterpretation of
history.  What is more, if this interpretation were to be believed by policymakers in the
countries which have lagged behind in transition, it could lead to a continuation of a failure to
come to grips with the barriers to economic growth.  Setting the record straight will not, of
course, change the outcome for Russia, or transform its failure into success.  It may, however,
persuade future policy makers to reject an imaginary ‘participatory’ approach to economic
reform based on a large dose of communitarian romanticism.
The paper is organised as follows.  In the next section we present what we think are
Stiglitz’s 20 key hypotheses regarding capitalism and the transition to it.  In Section 3 we
address what is meant by the terms “success of transition” and “privatisation”.  In Section 4
we challenge Stiglitz’s interpretation of the Chinese and Russian models of transition, and
describe the Central European (particularly Polish) and Baltic model which he ignores.  In the
subsequent seven sections we assess his hypotheses (grouped as below in Section 2) in the
light of the discussion in Section 4.  Finally, we summarise and put forward our own
explanation for the failure, to date, of the Russian transition.
2.  Stiglitz’s Key Hypotheses
Organisational Capital
1. The organisational capital present in enterprises under socialism is still very valuable
under conditions of transition.  It needs to be preserved rather than destroyed.  Once
dissipated, this organisational capital is hard to reassemble, particularly in environments
with little entrepreneurial experience.
2. Entrepreneurial efforts that arise out of or spin-off from existing enterprises may be
particularly effective3.
3. A high rate of new enterprise creation was not to be expected in the fSU given its lack of a
history of ‘market oriented entrepreneurship’.  FSU entrepreneurs, writes Stiglitz, have
developed skills in evading and profiting from government regulations, but these are far
different from those needed for creating new businesses and competing on international
markets.
4. Given the low probability of new enterprise creation and the difficulties in reassembling
organisational capital once dissipated, it is particularly important to promote the
restructuring of existing state enterprises.
Social Capital
5. Social capital encompasses the civil norms which allow trust, and this in turn is important
for all forms of inter-temporal trade.  Such capital is vital to a functioning market
economy.  Without it, social interaction would be reduced to a minimum of tentative and
distrustful commodity sales.
                                                
3 Other social organisations that might incubate and support entrepreneurial efforts include local township
governments, unions, schools...
36. The social norms which existed under socialism are inadequate for a market economy,
yet the development of new norms is bound to be time consuming.  Imposing laws which
do not correspond to existing norms is likely to fail because they will not be
implemented in the right spirit (if at all).
Short Agency Chains and Privatisation
7. In the more developed market economies long multi-stage chains of agency relationships
have developed.  If one tries to just set up a market economy overnight with such
extended agency relationships, this superstructure may collapse in dysfunction.  Long
agency chains, such as those implicit in voucher privatisation schemes (where workers
are agents for managers, managers for funds and funds for citizens) are likely to generate
fraud and inefficiency, contributing to output collapse and impeding subsequent recovery.
This is why the method of privatisation matters.
8. In the early transition, therefore, agency chains should be as short as possible.  One
example of this is the owner-operated business.
9.  Another way of establishing short agency chains is to privatise to the various stakeholders
in the business (workers, suppliers, customers, representatives of the local community)
who have a long-term relationship to the enterprise.  This also helps to save the
organisational capital within state owned enterprises (SOEs) – Thesis 1 above.  Hence the
correct sequencing of reform is:  regulate up front, restructure next, and privatise only
when market institutions are in place.
Privatisation, Corruption, Asset Stripping and Capital Flight
10. The ‘Coasian’ hypothesis that it does not matter whom assets are privatised to initially
because initial buyers will sell out to the highest bidder, and the highest bidder will be the
most efficient potential manager of the assets, is wrong in transition economies.  The
most efficient potential managers cannot buy the assets because they do not have the
wealth.
11. Inefficient new owners will therefore asset strip their companies.  Paradoxically, the same
would happen if innately efficient managers could borrow to purchase privatised firms.
This is because they would be so highly leveraged that they would have a great incentive
to strip assets from the firm which they control (1999b)4.
12. Inefficient new owners will invest much of their wealth in the political system, so as to
obtain preferential access to further state property to asset strip.  This leads to the
corruption of both the political and economic systems.
13. Privatisation carried out in this way will not be accepted as legitimate by society, so that
even if the property rights created in this way are very clearly defined as required by
Coase, they will not be secure.  This provides a further reason for asset stripping by new
owners and capital flight, the latter made easier in Russia by premature capital account
liberalisation.
                                                
4 One of us, as Supervisory Board member of a Polish state bank, stopped a number of proposed loans of this
kind, for this very reason.
4Bankruptcy and Restructuring
14. Bankruptcy is unlikely to result itself in much restructuring.  In the West most
restructuring takes place before bankruptcy.
15. Pre-bankruptcy restructuring should be fostered by encouraging decentralisation of
decisions within SOEs, so that the constituent parts can look for customers and suppliers
outside the existing firm and engage in ‘horizontal discussions’ with other units so as to
rebuild organisational relationships ‘from the ground up’, leading to recombination of the
units into new firms.
16. Making workers unemployed, whether through the bankruptcy or even the restructuring
of existing firms, is likely to be economically inefficient.  While employed they are at
least producing something, whereas - because of a lack of ‘market-oriented skills’ among
entrepreneurs - they are unlikely to find employment in new firms.  The same holds for
the capital made unemployed through bankruptcy.
17. Finally, the wrong firms are likely to be bankrupted since under socialism finance was
not allocated on a commercial basis, with the result that the distribution of debt is largely
random in the transition, and so is bankruptcy.
Inequality, Liberalisation and Stabilisation5.
18. The rapid transition attempted in the fSU and Eastern Europe has led to increased
inequality, increased poverty and reduced life expectancy.
19. Rapid liberalisation did not lead to rapid growth, at least in Eastern Europe.
20. The same is true of stabilisation.  Because of the need for relative price adjustments, very
rapid stabilisation of reduction may actually hinder micro-economic adjustment.
3.  Two Key Definitional Issues
For reform evaluations and comparisons, both Stiglitz and ourselves use the terms ‘success’
and ‘privatisation’.  These terms may not and need not be precisely defined, but should at
least be explained.
In his inter-temporal comparisons of China and Russia, Stiglitz uses the official
growth rate of GDP as the yardstick of the success of reforms.  This standard measure is
appropriate in most normal circumstances, but it is in our view inappropriate, indeed
misleading, in the initial period of transition.  The reason is that, at that time, economic
developments in the fSU and CE reflected not so much the quality of current reforms, but the
pre-reform crisis conditions, which led to the collapse of the Soviet style economic, military
and political system.  In Russia, because of this crisis, industrial output started to fall sharply
already in 1991, still under the old system.  Whether reform had taken place or not, this fall
would have presumably continued as the system unwound, as the experiences of slow and/or
                                                
5 All three theses are presented in Stiglitz (1999b).  They are initially discussed on p.2.  This is a significant
departure from Stiglitz (1999a), where stabilisation of inflation is praised and liberalisation is passed over in
silence, although the growth in inequality in Russia is, of course, discussed.
5late reformers would indicate, eg Bulgaria, Romania and Belarus.  For the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact (and the associated contraction of the defence industry), of the CMEA (and the
associated contraction of trade) and of the USSR itself (and the associated disruption of intra-
Soviet production links), have all been the inevitable consequences of earlier events, in
Russia and elsewhere.  The reduction in the output of the defence and related industries
alone, according to one knowledgeable source, accounts for 60 percent of the fall in industrial
production in Russia (Yasin, 1999).  China, on the other hand, was almost completely
immune to all these phenomena of  disintegration, and thus to the economic disruption they
brought in their train.  Furthermore, under socialism both output levels and output growth
were overstated (as managers tried to fulfil output targets on paper), while in the new market
economy they tend to be understated (as businesses try to avoid taxes). 6
Reforms themselves have involved rapid and massive changes in relative prices,
mainly as a result of price and trade liberalisations, sharp increases in nominal (typically also
real) interest rates, massive up-front devaluations and harmonisations in turnover tax rates.
These changes in relative prices caused shifts in demand and supply functions which, in
conditions of probably extremely low mobility of resources and apparently fairly limited
wage flexibility, tended to reduce outputs and increase inflation.  For these reasons it would
have been better if some of the required changes in relative prices had been introduced more
gradually, still under the old system, as they have been in China.  It was the resistance to such
reforms by earlier regimes in CE and, especially, in the fSU which meant that price and
structural distortions reached crisis levels.  When the crisis came, the old system collapsed
swiftly, and this collapse necessitated the establishment very quickly of a market-based co-
ordination mechanism, at the core of which are, of course, free market-clearing prices.
Moreover, the other reasons for output falls meant that structural adjustments would have to
be swift and large anyway.  Rapid price, trade and entry (PTE) liberalisations were thus also
needed to facilitate that supply-side restructuring.  Finally, the need to enhance competition
in markets which were often dominated by a few large firms also called for rapid PTE
liberalisations.
We therefore propose to measure success of reform in transition countries by their
ability to recreate the (institutional, legal and economic) conditions for rapid and sustainable
growth.  This ability is indicated by the increase of output from the start of recovery.  It is this
yardstick which has differentiated the Baltic countries strongly from Russia within the fSU,
and much of CE from much of the fSU.
A final point needs to be addressed here.  Stiglitz (1999b) states that the closing down
of loss-making enterprises cannot be a justification for the fall in output at the start of the
transition, since, if the resources previously used in such production are now made idle, their
true opportunity cost is zero, and therefore they should have been kept in their old use (where
the value added is low, but more than zero).7  This is wrong in principle.  The purpose of
reforms is both to restructure transition economies in favour of activities producing more
                                                
6 Stiglitz also compares post- and pre-transition growth for 19 transition countries (Figure 1, 1999b) where he
supposedly “compares the average growth rate of the economies in transition for the decade prior to the
transition with the past decade” (p.2).  Although a number of socialist economies suffered a significant
slowdown in the 1980s, Stiglitz gets round this by in fact comparing figures for the years 1977-89 with 1989-
98! Furthermore, although no source is given, Figure 1 is headed “Average GDP Growth”.  This is surprising, in
that none of the countries concerned calculated their GDP in the 1980s.  Since it excludes most services, the Net
Material Product which they did calculate usually grows noticeably faster than GDP.  Stiglitz (1999b) also
claims that the widespread use of barter in Russia may give an upward bias to GDP figures in that country
during the transition.  This may be so, but it does not remove the usual tax avoidance reason for output
understatement, or the fact that - more or less - correct transition output is compared by Stiglitz to socialist
output which is overstated by a large, but not precisely known, amount.
7 This is an application of Thesis 16 to the question of growth in the transition.
6value added per unit of primary inputs (of labour and capital), and to enable them to respond
flexibly in future to changes in supply and demand conditions.  Of course, if real wages were
perfectly flexible and labour and capital resources were perfectly moveable, then no fall of
output would be necessary.  However they are not, and unemployment, although it does
involve short-term costs both psychological and in terms of output foregone, performs a
positive role by making it clear to people that they have to either change skills and move to
higher productivity work or accept lower real wages.  Therefore, the welfare cost associated
with a temporary increase in unemployment and output can be thought of as an investment
needed to achieve permanent welfare gains from the better allocation of labour and other
resources in the future.8
As regards the concept of ‘privatisation’, we use the standard measure of the share of
output which originates in the private sector.  This concept refers, thus, to the privatisation of
the entire economy, and not necessarily to the privatisation of enterprises.  Such economy-
wide privatisation may occur, as it did in China or Poland, through the fast expansion of a
new private sector relative to the rest of the economy, rather than through privatisation of
existing SOEs.
4.  Three Models of Transition from Communism
Much of Joseph Stiglitz’s argument is based on the contrast between the success of the
Chinese transition and the economic failure so far of the Russian.  We suggest that Stiglitz
has misunderstood the reasons for China’s success, and misunderstood the facts (and
therefore the causes also) of Russia’s failure.  Finally, he has ignored the success of some of
the Central European and Baltic countries, and therefore has misconceived the real
requirements for successful transition.
A key reason for China’s success was indeed its underdevelopment.  The first way
this has helped has been the fact that only one fifth of the workforce was employed in the
state sector at the start of the reforms in 1978.  It was therefore possible to build a whole new
industrial sector from scratch, taking advantage of the underemployed labour which existed
in the countryside, without having to restructure the existing SOEs.  This new sector consists
of so-called Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and new private firms.  Just like the
creation of the de novo private sector in Poland and Estonia, this proved faster, easier and
more efficient than trying to restructure the economy by restructuring the state firms.  The
bulk of the growth in China has come from these new non-state enterprises that operate freely
on the market (see Xu and Zhuang, 1999, and Woo, 1998).
Nevertheless, it is the case that the production of SOEs has continued to expand in
China since 1978.  This is related to the second feature of China’s underdevelopment:  its low
productivity and the opportunities which exist as a result for rapid catching-up.  This is
known as the “Gerschenkron phenomenon” of the “relative advantages of backwardness”.  In
this respect the China of the 1980s and 1990s was like Russia from the 1930s through to the
1960s, when her own SOEs were very successful in expanding output and increasing
productivity according to official statistics (Gomulka, 1977, 1986 and 1988b).  Stiglitz just
chooses to ignore the impact of this significant difference in the level of development on
performance.
Of course, China had to create the framework in which new firms could be
established and grow, and this has been an important achievement.  However, it needs to be
                                                
8 China did not need to generate unemployment of this kind during its reforms due to the abundance of
underemployed labour it had in the countryside (see next section).
7remembered that the absence of privatisation and of an ‘institutional big bang’ has not
inhibited the growth of corruption in China, which seems to be on a scale comparable to that
in Russia (Section 6).  The same may be true of asset stripping and the amount of capital
flight from China (Section 8).
Furthermore, in spite of the impression given by Stiglitz, it does not seem to us that
corporate governance is particularly well developed in China.  Although “agency chains” are
indeed short, this is mainly because it is unclear whose agents the local authorities that
appoint ‘township and village enterprise’ managers really are:  the provincial government’s,
the Communist Party’s?  They certainly are not the agents of the local population, as they are
unelected.  Indeed, it is unclear whether they are anybody’s agents.  Rather, managers and
township officials form a local elite which rules in its own interests.  Thus ‘agency chains’ in
China may not so much be short as non-existent!  Finally, China has also failed to conform to
Stiglitz’s prescriptions by maintaining a high level of unemployment throughout its
transition.
Thus we reject the idea that China’s economic transition has been successful because
it:
1. Achieved efficiency enhancing restructuring by conserving the organisational
capital of its SOEs.
2. Sustained useful social norms inherited from socialism and avoided corruption
thanks to gradual institutional development.
3. Avoided harmful types of asset stripping by privatising to stakeholders and
maintaining ‘short agency chains’.  On the other hand it is true that China has had
little recourse to bankruptcy of SOEs, but with such huge underemployment of the
rural labour force and the small size of the state sector, it did not need to.
As regards Russia, Joseph Stiglitz makes three important factual errors and, we
suggest, one fundamental error of interpretation.  The first error is the statement that
manufacturing industry was privatised to outside ‘oligarchs’ and the attendant belief that had
it been privatised to inside ‘stakeholders’, the Russian economy would have fared better.
Stakeholders would have restructured the firms, preserving their organisational capital, rather
than asset stripping them, and the oligarchs would not have been able to develop their
noxious power, based on a combination of finance and political influence.  In fact, some 70
percent of manufacturing firms was initially privatised through Variant II of the mass
privatisation scheme to workers and managers, who are the classical stakeholders9.  The
subsequent evolution of the ownership structure in the direction of outsider control was the
result of free choices made by the insiders to sell out, and was in any case very modest
(Frydman, Pistor, Rapaczynski and Turkewitz, 1996).  Thus restructuring failed in Russia in
spite of the very privatisation to stakeholders that Stiglitz recommends.  Second, the oligarchs
made their money not through asset stripping manufacturing firms, but through their
preferential access to cheap credits from the Central Bank of Russia, the preferential
privatisation to them of natural resource based (not manufacturing) firms, and their ability to
arbitrage the difference between controlled domestic natural resource prices and free world
market ones.  They were also helped by the policy of closing off the Russian financial sector
to foreign competition.  Finally, a premature lifting of capital controls did not contribute to
asset stripping, as Stiglitz claims, for the simple reason that capital controls were never
                                                
9 The last variant, Variant III, was also insider dominated.
8lifted!10
These facts undermine Stiglitz’s main point about the Russian transition:  that in their
haste the Russian reformers followed the wrong privatisation strategy, excluding
stakeholders, with disastrous results in terms of restructuring, asset stripping and growth.  His
second point, that this same mistake led to the massive corruption of the political system, is
also wrong.  It was in fact the other way round:  an immature and corrupt political system has
led to inefficient and politically motivated privatisations of the natural resource sectors.
Stiglitz also claims that failure to privatise to insiders was part of a wider desire to
destroy existing institutions and norms, which were perceived by the reformers as tainted by
communism.  This created a moral void, which has led to the flowering of crime and
corruption.  We have pointed out above that mass privatisation in Russia did not in fact
destroy existing stakeholder groups or organisational capital.  Instead, crime and corruption
were probably more affected by the limited nature of price and trade liberalisation in Russia,
a process which was carried out far more thoroughly in CE and the Baltics, where it did not
lead to a similar collapse of norms11 (Section 6).  Furthermore, we believe that many of the
old social norms relating to economic activity, which had existed under socialism, died
before the collapse of communism.  Indeed, their death was a major reason for its collapse.
This is the major difference in interpretation regarding Russia between us and Stiglitz.  Thus,
in our view, in many areas there were no existing norms at all for the reformers to build new
institutions upon.  Some new institutions therefore had to be created quickly in the hope that
new norms would follow, because the old institutions could not function as the social norms
that had under-pinned them no longer existed12.
Finally, Stiglitz largely ignores the successful transitions of CE and the Baltics.  One
of the more successful countries has been Poland, where at the time of writing (2000) real
GDP was one quarter higher than at the beginning of the transition in 1989, by far the best
result in the region.  After a short but sharp contraction of about 15 percent in 1990 and 1991,
the economy has grown at an average rate of 5 percent per annum, compared to almost zero
growth during the 1980s, the last decade of socialism.  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary
and Slovenia have also experienced rapid growth in the last few years.  What enabled Poland,
which has had the best and most consistent growth record in CE, to achieve such success in
the 1990s after its failures in the 1980s?
The Polish model of transition consisted of five main elements:
1. Complete liberalisation of de novo private sector entry into almost all areas of
economic activity (January 1989).
2. Abolition of communist party organisations in SOEs, which gave real power to
the workers’ councils that had formally exercised it since 1981(end 1989).
3. Very rapid price liberalisation (during 1989 the share of freely determined prices
                                                
10 Capital flight in Russia has happened in spite of capital controls.  The Central Bank of Russia has described
some of the methods used (Financial Times, February 6, 2000).
11 However, this thoroughgoing liberalisation of prices and trade probably did much more  to destroy existing
entrenched interests than did the mass privatisation so reviled by Stiglitz.  Thus home grown gradualists and
opponents of reform in Eastern Europe often opposed ‘shock price, trade and entry liberalisation’ as much, if not
more than, ‘shock privatisation’.  We suspect that they understood the process better than does Stiglitz.
12 In  early 1992 two of us, who were acting as advisers to the Russian government at the time, reproached
Yegor Gaidar (at the time the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy) with the maintenance of
goszakazy (obligatory state delivery orders) on a large proportion of the output of the oil industry.  This was in
fact ‘dual pricing’ of the Chinese kind, so praised by some gradualists (eg McKinnon, 1991).  Gaidar’s response
was that these orders would be ignored by producers anyway.
9rose from 25 percent to 90 percent)13.
4. Introduction of hard budget constraints on SOEs and stabilisation of inflation
through tight fiscal, monetary and wages policies (January 1990).
5. Current account convertibility of the currency and almost complete foreign trade
liberalisation (January 1990).
This was certainly the most rapid programme of market reforms that had been implemented
until that time, although it should be noted that until 1995 privatisation of SOEs was not very
rapid and was largely limited to small and medium sized firms.  The results of the programme
were:
1. The rapid introduction of market prices based on relative scarcity and world prices
for traded goods.
2. A financial squeeze on SOEs, which forced them to quickly release excess labour
and physical capital (so called asset privatisation)14.
3. The maintenance of a minimum tolerable level of effective corporate governance
in SOEs thanks to the workers’ councils.
4. Very rapid development of the de novo private sector.15
As we noted earlier, growth resumed quickly (in the third year of the transformation,
compared to the Russian case where it has taken 8 years) and has proceeded at a rapid pace16.
In the early transition growth was driven entirely by de novo private sector development,
rather than through the restructuring of SOEs, privatised or otherwise (Rostowski, 1993,
Gomulka, 1998a,b).  De novo private activity, which at first grew rapidly in services, began
to expand in manufacturing industry at a rate in excess of 40 percent per annum already in
1991.  An average rate of growth in excess of 25 percent was then sustained for about 5
years.  More recently foreign direct investment has begun to make a significant contribution
to growth.  All this has resulted in a doubling of manufacturing output since 199117.
This Polish experience (and to an extent that of other Central European and Baltic
countries) demonstrates:
                                                
13 We include the final liberalisation of some 30 percent of prices on January 1, 1990 in this figure.  Detailed
descriptions of the programme and the model are contained in Lipton and Sachs (1990) Gomulka (1995, 1998a)
and Dabrowski (1999).
14Unemployment grew very fast, from zero at the beginning of 1990 to 7.5 percent of the labour force at its end.
15 The experience of Hungary was quite similar.  The same five main elements of reform were introduced as in
Poland, although this took between two and three years instead of just over one year, and workers councils had
little importance.  Also, the domestic de novo private sector tended to grow in services rather than in
manufacturing, where quite rapid development was due to foreign direct investment.  This somewhat more
gradual approach led to a fall in GDP at the beginning of the transition, which was slightly deeper than that in
Poland (18 percentage points instead of 15).  A larger external debt burden and poorer macroeconomic policies
meant that stabilisation of the GDP contraction took two years longer than in Poland, but more importantly, the
beginning of rapid growth was delayed by five years, until 1997 (De Broek and Koen, 2000).
16 Unemployment is now about 12 percent, inflation is under 10 percent, the share of industry in GDP is close to
western levels at 25 percent compared to over 45 percent at the end of the 1980s.
17 We start counting at this date because much of the industrial output before 1990 was highly inefficient and
only demanded because of the generalised excess demand in the economy and massive protectionist barriers.  It
was this output which was eliminated in the 35 percent collapse in industrial output of 1990-91.
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1. The usefulness of pre-existing rules and institutions as Stiglitz stresses (workers’
councils, a commercial code, about one tenth of the labour force in the non-
agricultural private sector before the transition).
2. The importance of macro-economic stabilisation and the accompanying
imposition of hard budget constraints, which Stiglitz questions.
3. The importance of the liberalisation of prices, trade and entry, which Stiglitz
challenges.
4. The possibility of rapid growth of new private enterprise, which Stiglitz flatly
denies.
Strikingly, Table 1 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2000) shows that today one cannot distinguish
between ex-socialist and mature western market economies on the basis of the willingness of
their populations to undertake self-employment.  However, there apparently remains to this
day a wide variation between different transition countries in this respect (as indeed there is
between different mature western market economies):
Table 1
Latent Entrepreneurship:  An International League Table
Suppose you were working and could choose between different kinds of jobs.  Which would
you prefer:  being an employee or being self-employed?
% who would prefer
to be self-employed
N
Poland 79.9 922
Portugal 73.3 1616
USA 70.8 1071
Switzerland 64.5 2216
New Zealand 64.2 1046
W Germany 64.0 957
Italy 63.3 973
Slovenia 57.8 820
Canada 57.5 857
East Germany 56.6 389
Bulgaria 55.4 900
Hungary 49.8 1419
Israel 49.7 972
Great Britain 45.1 953
France 41.8 918
Japan 40.9 1065
Spain 38.9 1138
Sweden 38.8 1129
Czech Rep 36.8 961
Netherlands 36.0 2013
Russia 33.2 1409
Denmark 29.7 992
Norway 26.9 2021
N is the number of people interviewed in each nation.  A sample of the whole adult population is
interviewed.
The Israel sample is for Israeli Jews only.  Data for Cyprus, Bangladesh and Philippines are omitted.
Source:  1997/8 ISSP Module on Work Orientations/ US General Social Survey.
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Thus, “latent entrepreneurship” is high in North America and most of Western and CE
(above all Poland), and low in Scandinavia and Russia (and also the Czech Republic).  This
index presumably expresses not only any cultural predisposition to entrepreneurship which
may exist, but also the assessment by the population of the conditions for self-employment
(relative to employment) in the country concerned.  Thus, the low scores in Scandinavia are
possibly due to the high benefits accruing to employees there.  Since that is clearly not the
case in Russia, we need to consider what reasons might be causing Russians’ unwillingness
to become self-employed.
In spite of large differences in industrial structure and history between CE and Russia,
the differences between Russia and China are much greater, particularly as regards level of
development at the beginning of the transition.  Comparing Russia with Poland and Estonia
in particular, and CE and the Baltics in general, is likely to be at least as fruitful as comparing
it to China.  In examining Stiglitz’s 20 theses (arranged in six main groups) we therefore
draw on all three experiences.
5.  Organisational Capital
Although they are discussed separately in (1999a), Stiglitz treats organisational and social
capital as indistinguishable from reputational capital in (1999b, pp.20-21).  We prefer to deal
separately with each in the three sections below.  Organisational capital we take to be the
value of a productive organisation over and above the value of its assets.  It exists because
things can be done more efficiently within the organisation, due to habits, formal rules and
trust which have built up.  Organisational capital is thus a name we give to the efficiencies
which Coase (1937) used to explain the existence of firms.  It can, of course, differ in amount
between organisations, even those in the same line of business.  We define reputational
capital as generating trust between organisations and between organisations and individuals.
Within an organisation, we take reputational capital to generate trust which adheres to an
individual, whereas if the trust adheres to a post (rather than its holder) then we may be
talking of organisational rather than reputational capital.  Social capital we take to be far
more diffused within a society.  On the one hand it consists in formal rules and institutions
(legal codes, court systems), on the other in general rules of behaviour, which we expect even
from those whose reputation we do not know.  For example, in most countries, when asking
for directions in a strange city we do not expect to be intentionally lied to.
Our view is that Stiglitz is wrong on both counts in Thesis 1:  the organisational
capital present in socialist SOEs is not very valuable, and it is not particularly hard to
reassemble it in a more efficient way in new private enterprises.  The evidence for the former
proposition is the fact that, in transition economies, de novo private firms have been found to
be far more efficient than all other categories of firm – both privatised and state owned – with
the exception of firms run by foreign direct investors (see the large survey-based literature,
including Estrin and Wright, 1999; Schaffer et.al, 1998).  The reasons for this seem to be the
following:
1. Much of the organisational structure of the SOE is unsuited to operation in a
market – eg the almost complete absence of a sales and marketing function and
the considerable attention paid by management to purchasing (quite rational in a
shortage economy) and lobbying the state (rational in a state run economy).
2.  The capital structure and the labour skills structure of SOEs are usually unsuited
to producing goods profitably at the relative prices which obtain after the
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liberalisation of prices, entry and international trade.  Yet ‘whittling down’ SOEs
to the activities which might be efficient is a far harder job than creating new
tailor made private firms out of selected physical assets bought from various
SOEs or imported from abroad, and labour with particular skills.  The reason for
this is the resistance of stakeholders to restructuring, compared to the free hand
which new entrepreneurs have in deciding what goods to produce, what assets to
buy and what labour to hire on competitive markets.
The relative ease of reassembling factors of production (including organisational capital) if
the environment is right for new firm creation is demonstrated by the extraordinarily rapid
growth in the number, size and output of new private firms in Poland since 1990, which we
described in the previous section18.
While it is true that fSU entrepreneurs developed skills in evading and profiting from
government regulations before the transition, and that many operated on the interface
between legal and illegal activity, the same was true of Polish and Estonian entrepreneurs.
This is illustrated by the figures for ‘economic crime’ in Poland, which show a dramatic fall
when the transition began, government intervention in the economy was reduced and many
commercial activities were decriminalised.  The result was that the number of such
‘economic crimes’ fell from 26,741 in 1985 to 6,042 in 1990.  These facts throw doubt on
Stiglitz’s Thesis 3.  The relevant question is therefore not:  how could Russian reformers, and
their Western advisers, have been so naive as to think that entrepreneurs would create a host
of new firms to restructure the economy? but rather:  what were the conditions which allowed
entrepreneurs to do so in Poland or Estonia but not in Russia?  We shall return to this
question in the Conclusion.
6.  Social Capital
We agree entirely with Stiglitz on Thesis 5, and also largely on Thesis 6.  Indeed, we suspect
that Thesis 6 may have been one of the factors which explains why rapid de novo private
sector development occurred in Poland and other Central European and Baltic countries, but
not in Russia19.  Of course, ex ante policy makers had no reason to suppose that this would
prove to be the case, as we have argued in the previous section.  Our main problem, however,
is with the unstated hypothesis that there existed social norms in the Soviet Union which
would have allowed the maintenance of the existing structure of industry and the existing
level of output for a considerable time.  During this time, Stiglitz assumes, new norms could
have been developed which would have provided the basis for the new institutions of an
efficient form of capitalism.  As stated earlier, our understanding is, rather, that the social
norms which sustained the communist economic system died or decayed before the system
itself collapsed.  We can see this, in the case of Poland, in the increase in the number of
‘economic crimes’ which occurred during the period when belief in the socialist system
collapsed between 1980 and 198520.  In 1980 there were 7,659 such crimes reported, but by
1985 the number had increased to 26,741.
                                                
18  This disposes of Stiglitz’s Thesis 4.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that any significant number of these
firms were spin-offs from SOEs, which casts doubt on Thesis 2.
19 There were other, more important, reasons which we discuss in the Conclusion.  These, we believe were the
result of policy errors.
20  In 1980 the Gdansk shipyard workers went on strike under the slogan “workers of all factories unite!” and in
Szczecin the slogan was “Socialism, yes! Deformations (of socialism), no!”.  By 1985 opinion polls in Poland
showed a large majority in favour of a far-reaching shift to a market economy and significant privatisation.
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Thus, governments were faced not so much with the task of transforming existing
socialistic norms into new capitalist ones, but rather with a state of anomie, or of an absence
of norms relevant to economic activity21.  Clearly, under these circumstances, waiting for the
new norms to develop spontaneously before introducing new laws was not a practical option.
New laws and institutions had to be introduced quickly in the hope that they would help
society to develop the new norms it needed.  To this extent the reformers were indeed
Bolshevik in their behaviour, but this was out of necessity not inclination (many had been
keen readers of Hayek).  In some countries this approach succeeded, in others it did not.  But
there was no way of knowing in advance which countries would prove successful in this
respect.  Indeed, many observers at the time expected Poland to be in the unsuccessful camp.
Of course, there have been a few backward or very isolated countries where the old
socialistic norms continued to hold sway for a long time, Belarus and Turkmenistan being
examples.  But, being pre-transitional economies and societies, these cases do not appear
relevant to a discussion on the optimal path of transition.  China certainly does not seem to be
the exception which proves (ie tests) the rule.  In China, corruption (which we take to be a
measure of the degree to which norms are not suited to the needs of a market economy),
seems to be on a scale second only to that in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
and ahead of CE and the Baltics which experienced far more institutional shock therapy.
Table 2
Corruption Perception Indexes (1999)
(lower score means more corruption)
Slovenia
Estonia
Hungary
Czech Rep
Poland
Lithuania
Slovakia
6.0
5.7
5.2
4.6
4.2
3.8
3.7
Latvia
China
Belarus
Bulgaria
Romania
Ukraine
Vietnam
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.3
3.3
2.6
2.6
Russia
Albania
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Rep
Yugoslavia
Uzbekistan
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.2
1.8
Source:  Transparency International reported in Transition Newsletter, October 1999.
Social capital should be thought of as including not only unwritten norms and trust
but also laws and formal institutions.  In this respect Poland and Hungary were relatively well
placed.  Poland had a commercial code, which had been in operation since 1982, while
Hungary built up a body of company law from 1985.22  Furthermore, Poland had a de-
monopolised commercial property structure (including a large private sector), which only
needed the abolition of rent controls for a fairly competitive commercial property market to
spring into existence.  Hungary had introduced a western style tax system before 1989 and
had broken up its monobank into a two tier banking system already in 1987.  On the other
hand, a number of significant institutional changes were also carried out in the USSR before
the transition began.  Co-operatives (which were in effect private businesses) were allowed
from 1988, and had expanded enormously by 1992.  The banking system was thoroughly de-
monopolised in 1989.  As Stiglitz mentions, work collectives received considerable formal
powers, and by the beginning of 1992 some 10,000 enterprises had been leased by managers
                                                
21 Interestingly, civil norms relevant to family life and inter-personal relations do not seem to have been affected
to the same extent initially.  Thus crimes of violence and crimes against the family were the same in 1990 as in
1980 in Poland (although subsequently, over the first five years of the transition, they doubled).
22 This was, in fact, the 1934 code, which was merely suspended by the Communists after the Second World
War.
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and workers from the state.
We cannot, therefore, explain all of the relative success of transition in CE and the
Baltics by the fact that significant reforms preceded the beginning of transition there, but not
in Russia.  This is especially so since the Baltic countries started with the same institutional
inheritance as Russia did, and there were practically no pre-transition reforms in the former
Czechoslovakia, which in spite of all its problems, has far outperformed Russia.  Thus, the
relevant question is:  why did ‘shock therapy’ succeed in building on earlier reforms in
Poland and Estonia, while attempted shock therapy failed to do so in Russia?
7.  Short Agency Chains and Privatisation
We agree very strongly with Theses 7 and 8, and partly with Thesis 9.  Indeed, we consider
that here Stiglitz has provided an important insight into both the development of capitalism in
the West and the transition process in central and eastern Europe.  The rapid growth of
owner-operated businesses has been the hallmark of those Central European and Baltic
transitions which have been successful.  We also consider that workers’ self-management
played an important part in limiting the fall in output and the amount of criminal asset
stripping in the state sector in Poland.  Indeed, two of us argued at the time in favour of the
advantages of workers’ management as a form of corporate governance, against the advice
coming from the World Bank23.  Thus we also agree with Stiglitz that the method of
privatisation matters, and that methods involving long agency chains (such as the Czech
variant of voucher privatisation) are not likely to be very successful for the reasons of breach
of trust which Stiglitz describes24.
Indeed, we would suggest that there is a very good reason why long agency chains
require a long time to develop.  This is the need for providers of agency services to build up
the ‘reputational capital’ which will induce the potential purchasers of these services to trust
them.  Typically, providers of monitoring and screening services come to markets with a
certain amount of net worth in the form of physical and financial assets, which stand as
guarantee (ie implicit collateral) for the implicit liabilities which they undertake in the
process of monitoring and screening.  Given a reasonably well functioning legal system,
breaches of trust will lead to a loss of physical and financial assets.  As providers of agency
services build up reputational capital, their need for physical and financial capital to reassure
customers declines.  As a result, their capital costs fall and they obtain a higher return on
equity25.  This causes a virtuous circle, as such cost savings on capital further increase the
value of the reputational capital of the firm, which customers know would be lost in the event
of a breach of trust.  This is why even in mature capitalist economies, new forms of agency
services are often provided by firms which are already well established as providers of other
                                                
23 In 1990, Dabrowski was Deputy Minister of Finance and Rostowski was an adviser.  The World Bank
missions negotiating the Structural Adjustment Loan were eager to see workers’ councils replaced by
government appointed supervisory boards in SOEs.  The World Bank argument was that the state, being the
owner of the firms, must manage them.  The Polish negotiating team presented the view that, if the state was
capable of managing firms effectively, then central planning would have worked.  The main rationale for this
position was that the workers had better motivation than bureaucrats in ensuring efficient work by their
managers.  The World Bank representatives were surprised to find themselves accused of ‘statism’ by the Polish
side, and retorted that they were usually accused of being free market ideologues.  This shows that the real
situation was more nuanced than Stiglitz’s picture of ‘western’ advisers and institutions imposing radical market
solutions on unwilling or uncomprehending easterners.
24 Except for Dabrowski, we supported voucher privatisation at the time, wrongly as it turned out.
25 By definition, ‘reputational capital’ cannot be easily borrowed or lent.  It does not therefore involve much
opportunity cost compared to financial or physical capital.
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services which require them to have a large amount of ‘reputational capital’26.  In the early
transition, of course, hardly anyone has any reputational capital to lose27.
Turning to Thesis 9, we have already expressed our view that giving corporate
governance rights to workers can be quite efficient in the early transition.  However, we have
to enter three important caveats.  First, workers’ management is no different from other forms
of agency arrangement, in that it requires some pre-existing tradition (social norms) and
reputational capital, which will allow it to function.  Representatives elected to the workers’
council need to feel obliged to defend the interests of their electors, and not to just further
their own.  This is particularly important in a context in which privatisation is expected quite
quickly, and with it the disappearance of the workers’ council, so that representatives may not
have the incentive of prospective re-election.  In Poland this tradition existed28, in Russia it
did not.  Russian reformers could no more create such a tradition ab ovo than they could have
implanted Quaker business ethics in the new capitalist class.  This point is confirmed by the
fact that, as we pointed out in Section 3, most SOEs in Russia were privatised via Variant II
of the voucher privatisation scheme predominantly to the workers.  Yet these workers
generally proved unable to ensure effective corporate governance for their firms, or to
prevent the asset stripping which Stiglitz so deplores.
Our second caveat relates to the inclusiveness of Stiglitz’s proposal to privatise to ‘the
various stakeholders in the business’.  He subsequently goes on to identify workers, suppliers,
customers and representatives of the local community as the relevant stakeholders.  We
suspect that such an approach would lead to paralysis and endless conflict between the
various entrenched interests within the firm.  A vital part of transition is switching suppliers
from traditional to new, more efficient, often foreign ones.  Equally, sales often need to be
shifted to new customers who are prepared to pay more.  Entrenching the position of existing
interest groups within the decision making structure of the firm would thus be a recipe for
failure to restructure, and therefore for failure of the transition.  While agency chains should
be short, the corporate governance structure needs to be clear, with power concentrated in the
hands of those whose interests are most closely aligned with an efficient use of the capital
embodied in the firm.  This may, under certain circumstances be the local community (Wiles,
1977), or as in Poland the workforce (in spite of the well-known drawbacks of workers’
management as compared to mature capitalism)29.
                                                
26 Take the famous example of 17th century goldsmiths who became bankers in England.  This was not just
because they had strong-rooms where gold could be deposited safely, but also because they had proved
themselves to be trusted with other people’s gold when they worked it (and would thus lose not only their new
business but also the old, if they failed in their trust).  The expansion of banks into mutual fund management in
the 1970s follows the same principle.
27 The difficulties created by this situation were reflected by the debate which took place in Poland in mid-1991
about how to ensure minimally decent corporate governance for the 1000 large SOEs in which the government
wanted to abolish workers’ management and take into direct state ownership.  This was motivated by the
disadvantages of workers management mentioned in Footnote 30, despite the misgivings mentioned in Footnote
24.  A major difficulty with the proposal was where to find the several thousand supervisory board members
which the scheme would require.  Private businessmen, although they existed in large numbers, would suffer
from a conflict of interests as would politicians and commercial lawyers, bureaucrats would have a lack of
motivation, schoolteachers, it was thought, were despised by the population for having been a pillar of the
communist regime, doctors were considered to be profoundly corrupt, so the only groups which met the
requirements were economists and priests! But priests would not be allowed to participate by the Church
hierarchy, and there were not enough economists.  This shortage of individuals with the requisite reputation for
honesty and relevant competence was, we believe, a major reason why the programme was sharply scaled down
and delayed by a number of years.
28 The first workers’ councils were established in Poland during the post-Stalinist thaw of 1956.
29 These are (1) the tendency to ‘underemploy’; (2) to disinvest; (3) to choose technologies which are
excessively capital intensive for such investment as does take place.  However, we consider that the tendency to
disinvest can be beneficial during the transition if it means that physical assets are sold on the open market to
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Finally, since we do not think that socialist SOEs had much organisational capital of
value, we do not consider it important to ‘save’ it in its pre-transition form by entrenching the
rights of the various stakeholders.  Stiglitz’s proposal for ‘government by discussion’
between the various stakeholder groups within firms thus seems to us a striking example of
the ‘communitarian romanticism’, which pervades much recent writing on the importance of
social and organisational capital in the transition (eg Gray, 1995).
8.  Privatisation, Corruption, Asset Stripping and Capital Flight
There are aspects of Theses 10-13 with which we agree, and aspects with which we strongly
disagree.  Clearly, it matters whom assets are privatised to initially, if only because the re-
allocation of assets in the market takes place in time, and not instantaneously.  The question
posed by Thesis 10 is therefore:  do assets reach efficient owners faster by being privatised to
the population as a whole, to the friends of top politicians, by being kept longer in state hands
and then being privatised to more efficient owners (such as foreign investors), or by being
privatised rapidly to ‘stakeholders’ as Stiglitz suggests?
In the previous section, we accepted that “voucher privatisation” has not been
efficient, largely for the reasons Stiglitz expounds.  We also agree with his (1999b) view that
sale to foreigners cannot be a widely applied solution in the early transition.  Others have
made the point that state ownership does not prevent asset stripping when the state is weak
and, above all, when there are many price and trade controls (Aaslund, 1999).  We have
already expressed our doubts regarding ‘multi-stakeholder’ privatisation, and pointed out that
privatisation to managers and workers (the classical stakeholders) is largely what actually
happened in Russia, so that the barrier to the transfer of assets to more efficient users must
have lain elsewhere.
An important question is:  to what phenomena can the term ‘asset stripping’
legitimately be applied in transition?  In the West, the term is usually applied to so-called
‘corporate raiders’, who seize management control of a company and sell its most easily
realisable assets for prices which together are higher than they paid for the firm, but are said
by objectors to be less than the ‘true’ value the firm would be worth (ie could be sold for) if
the raiders were willing to spend time on its restructuring and resuscitation.  Implicit in the
concept is the idea, so dear to Stiglitz, that there exists in the firm organisational capital
which is somehow undervalued by the market for corporate ownership.  However, although
the old organisational capital might be lost, the Polish, Estonian and Hungarian experiences
suggest that the new organisational capital, which is created in its place, might be more
valuable.
The biggest weakness of Stiglitz’s perspective on this topic is the link he makes
between privatisation as it was carried out in Russia, corruption, and the lack of restructuring
due to bad corporate governance and asset stripping (Theses 12 and 13).  The greatest
fortunes in Russia were made not through privatisation of manufacturing (where the
restructuring was most needed), but through privatisation of the seignorage stream generated
by the Central Bank of Russia (Dabrowski and Rostowski, 1998, Boone and Hoerder, 1998),
through arbitraging the differences between controlled prices for raw materials within Russia
and free market prices abroad (Aaslund, 1999), and through favouritism in the privatisation
of natural resource based industries, which began in 1995.  It was the Russian treasury which
was directly asset stripped, not the manufacturing firms, and it was the fortunes made at that
                                                                                                                                                       
those who are able to make better use of them, usually to de novo private firms.  Wiles (1977), Chapters 4 and 6
are an early analysis of ‘community firms’ and their virtues.
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time which have sustained the political power of the oligarchs.
We have already pointed out in Section 4 that capital flight from Russia has not, as
Stiglitz claims, occurred as a result of premature liberalisation of capital movements, but in
spite of the absence of such liberalisation.  This is a mistake that Stiglitz extends in (1999b,
p.14) to most transition economies except, strangely, to China, where in fact it appears to be
of similar magnitude, relative to exports, as in Russia30.  The presence of such large capital
flight in China suggests that it is paying a price for the lack of clarity in its property rights
and corporate governance structures, and for the very reasons that Stiglitz describes with
regard to Russia.
Nevertheless, Stiglitz does bring home the point that those of us who thought that
rapid privatisation was needed to prevent asset stripping were probably excessively anxious
about a phenomenon which, in the light of experience, seems to have been unavoidable and
not necessarily undesirable.
Indeed, an important question is:  why did asset stripping of the typical Western kind,
and indeed of the kind carried out perfectly legally by Polish worker managed manufacturing
firms (ie sale of assets for which outsiders have better use), not in fact happen in Russia?  If it
had, then the dynamic private sector development which so benefited Polish manufacturing,
and which was largely absent in Russia, might have occurred.  We shall return to this
question in the Conclusion.
9.  Bankruptcy and Restructuring
We agree with Thesis 14.  We would point out, however, that a mechanism for the seizure of
assets by creditors is very important both for developing the credit market by encouraging
lenders to lend (among other things for restructuring), and for imposing discipline on
borrowers.  Furthermore, much restructuring does indeed occur before bankruptcy, but this is
because the parties know that bankruptcy exists.  While decentralising decision-making in
SOEs, so that the constituent parts of the firm can recombine into new firms (Thesis 15) is
probably harmless, we know of no successful application of this approach.  In Poland, at the
beginning of the transition constituent plants of multi-plant SOEs were given the right to
secede, and hundreds of them did so during 1989-91.  Although this was healthy for the
economy, it may have looked a lot like asset stripping to the workers left behind in the less
profitable plants of a multi-plant SOE!  Also, we know of no cases of “recombination” of
such “secessionist” plants.31.
While Thesis 16 is true in the short run everywhere, if its logic were accepted very
                                                
30 If we add the current account surplus and foreign direct investment inflows for the years 1995-98 for China,
and then subtract the increase in reserves, we are left with some $120 billion unaccounted for.  Most of this is
capital flight, shown in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (1999) as purchases abroad of investment
assets by “other sectors” ($50 billion) and “net errors and omissions” ($49 billion), giving average annual
capital flight of about $33 billion.  When we normalise on the value of exports  (which is about twice as high in
China), this is quite comparable with Russia, where capital flight has varied between $12 billion and $24 billion
per annum (statement by representatives of the Central Bank of Russia quoted in the Financial Times (5
February 2000, p.2).  The Central European countries, on the other hand, have experienced quite large capital
inflows during 1995-98 (EBRD, 1999).
31 Poland developed a fairly competitive structure of state industry early in the transition.  In the second half of
the 1980s, before the beginning of the transition proper, the giant associations of enterprises (zrzeszenia) that
existed under central planning were abolished.  Then, at the start of the transition, whole sectors were
demonopolised “from above” by the government (meat processing, sugar, flour, country and inter-city bus
services).  However, competition from the de novo private sector and from imports was more important in
inhibiting monopoly.
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little restructuring would happen anywhere.  We have already shown that transition
economies have not, in general, suffered from the shortage of ‘market-oriented
entrepreneurial skills’ that Stiglitz attributes to them.  The key thing, of course, is the
imposition of hard budget constraints (something which Stiglitz himself stresses as important
in 1999a).  Zero unemployment was maintained under central planning through price controls
and generalised excess demand for both labour and goods (in the latter case leading to
generalised shortages).  Since prices did not reflect relative scarcities under such
circumstances, restructuring and privatisation are impossible until prices are liberalised and
generalised excess demand is abolished.  Furthermore, with a guarantee of full employment
and soft budget constraints facing firms, there is nothing to prevent workforces (whether
organised in trade unions or not) from demanding ever higher wages32.  Under such
conditions, full employment can only be maintained by an accommodative monetary policy,
leading to accelerating (and ultimately hyper-) inflation (Rostowski, 1989).  Indeed, inflation
can only be stopped by allowing unemployment to reach the natural (or NAIRU) level, and
this is certainly not zero!33  High inflation makes restructuring and privatisation much harder,
because:
1. Rapidly changing nominal prices make it harder to observe the underlying relative
prices on which restructuring and privatisation via sales have to be based.
2. Accounting and taxation systems are not inflation adjusted so that the lack of
transparency caused by high inflation makes tax avoidance and asset stripping of
outside shareholders, stakeholders and the state much easier34.
3. In an economy with a large number of remaining price controls, inflation provides
huge opportunities for enrichment through arbitrage.
For all these reasons full employment, be it of labour or capital, is simply not an option in
transition.
Furthermore, it is striking that in CE hard budget constraints led large SOEs to shed a
large amount of labour, to change their product mix etc.  This is so-called “defensive
restructuring”.  Grosfeld and Roland (1996) found that a sample of 600 large SOEs in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland shed about 30 percent of their workforces in the first 2
years of the transition.  This indicates that the dilemma Stiglitz outlines in (1999b, pp.25-26),
according to which privatisation is impossible without prior restructuring, but restructuring
                                                
32 Strong dictatorships are able, for a time, to resist such pressure by the use of repressive police measures
against worker activism, but by simultaneously repressing markets they make restructuring impossible.  In any
event, many of the dictatorships of the Soviet block were too weak for this by the late 1980s, and the new
democracies were quite unable to follow this path.  Indeed, even China, which is often cited as a strong
dictatorship, abandoned generalised excess demand in the mid-1980s.
33 Normally, one would expect the actual level of unemployment to need to exceed the ‘natural’ rate if inflation
is to be reduced rather than stabilised.  However, if the effect of unemployment on inflation is partly due to its
rate of increase (for instance because this influences people’s expectation of becoming unemployed in the near
future), then early transition economies may stabilise prices with unemployment rates which are not higher than
those of many mature market economies, in spite of the far greater number of rigidities in the former
(Rostowski, 1998).
34 At the start of the transition in Russia loans bearing nominal interest rates of 14 percent per annum were
considered very expensive by the public, in spite of inflation exceeding 1000 percent per annum.  There was
thus no objection when the central bank made such loans to preferred individuals, even though the loans were
effectively a gift from the state.  Also, Variant II of the Russian mass privatisation scheme sold firms to their
employees at book value, which – due to the inflation which had occurred since 1991 - meant roughly 10
percent of real value.
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by the state was held by the reformers to be impossible, has in fact a very simple solution.
As regards Thesis 17, its validity depends on the country concerned.  Those countries
that suffered from very high inflation in the pre-transition period and during the early
transition35, found that this tended to reduce the real value of enterprise debt owed to banks
very considerably (thus in early 1990 such debt was the equivalent of about 7 percent of
annual GDP in Poland, compared to 70 percent in Czechoslovakia).  As a result, debt was not
a major factor in the failure of most firms in such countries in the early transition.  Far more
important was low cash flow due to inefficiency and bad product mix36.  Furthermore, in
those countries that had experienced some marketisation before the fall of communism
(Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, the USSR), SOE debt was often the result of lobbying of
central planners and/or banks by firms.  Firms were thus, to a certain degree, responsible for
their debt.  Stiglitz’s point does apply to countries in which strict central planning was
maintained until the very end and where inflation was relatively low, but there were only two
of these:  Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.
10.  Inequality, Liberalisation and Stabilisation
It is certainly true, as Stiglitz points out, that the transition to capitalism in the former Soviet
block and Yugoslavia has led to a large increase in inequality.  This is, perhaps, not entirely
surprising to those who have read Marx.  However, there is no evidence that, as Stiglitz
implies37, inequality has increased because reformers adopted “shock therapy”.  Nor is there
evidence that where life expectancy has deteriorated this has occurred because of rapid
transition strategies, as is again implied by Stiglitz.
To verify Stiglitz’s conclusions we divided the transition countries into “early
liberalisers”, “late liberalisers” and “non-liberalisers” according to the EBRD classification
(EBRD, 1999, p64).  We then looked at the changes in Gini coefficients between 1987-89
and 1993-95 reported in Milanovic (1998), and at the change in life expectancy reported by
Stiglitz himself in (1999b) following EBRD (1999).  It turns out that early liberalisers
experienced a much smaller average increase in their Gini coefficients than late liberalisers
and non-liberalisers (see Table 3).  Similarly, early liberalisers experienced an improvement
in life expectancy between 1989 and 1997 (by 0.7 years on average, with no early liberaliser
experiencing a decline), while late and non-liberalisers experienced equivalent average
declines (although six of the 18 countries in these two categories also experienced an increase
in life expectancy).  We have a similar story when we look at early stabilisers (although we
now have one country, Latvia, where life expectancy fell)38.
                                                
35 Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and the USSR (in Bulgaria SOE debt was denominated in foreign currency and
thus could not be inflated away).
36 This did not prevent debt from accumulating in the worst firms in Poland (Gomulka, 1994), but this was
because the good firms paid off their debts when real interest rates became sharply positive at the beginning of
the stabilisation programme.
37 In (1999b, p.2) Stiglitz writes of the lower growth, worse health conditions and greater inequality as great
failures of the transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  Since the rest of the paper is devoted to
demonstrating that rapid transition is  mistaken, it is natural to assume that it is also, somehow, responsible for
these problems.
38 We define as “early stabilisers” those countries that achieved an inflation rate of under 50 percent per annum
(December to December) by 1994, without a subsequent severe relapse.  This definition differs from that of
EBRD (1999), which is merely that there should have been a stabilisation programme before 1993.  We consider
this inadequate, as it does not take into account whether the programme was successful, or whether the
stabilisation was sustained.
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Table 3
Transition, Inequality and Life Expectancy
Transition Group Change in Gini
Coefficient
Change in Life
Expectancy
(in years)
Early liberalisers
Late liberalisers
Non-liberalisers
Early stabilisers
Late stabilisers
Early privatisers (1)
Late privatisers (1)
Early privatisers (2)
Late privatisers (2)
4.3
14.0
11.0
4.9
13.4
6.2
12.8
7.6
11.4
+0.7
-0.8
-0.9
+1.0
-0.9
+1.0
-0.8
+0.2
-0.7
Source:  own calculations based on EBRD (1999), Milanovic (1998) and Stiglitz (1999b).
Things become less clear when we look at privatisation.  On our more restrictive
definition of “early privatisation” (a combined score of 7 or 8 in the EBRD (1995)
privatisation index39 plus over 50 percent of GDP in 1994 generated by the private sector),
early privatisers perform far better than late privatisers, both in the deterioration of the Gini
coefficient and in life expectancy (only one early-privatiser, Lithuania, has a fall in life
expectancy, and that is only 0.3 years).  On the other hand if we adopt a looser definition of
early privatisation, requiring only that over 50 percent of GNP be generated in the private
sector by mid-1994, then the difference between the two groups becomes smaller as regards
increases in Gini coefficients, and early privatisers have on average only a tiny increase in
life expectancy (also four of the nine countries in the group register declines)40.
Nevertheless, even in this case, there is no evidence that early privatisers performed worse on
inequality and life expectancy than late privatisers!  It is worth noting that Russia is not
classified as an early liberaliser, as an early stabiliser or as an early privatiser (except on the
looser definition).
Turning to Thesis 19, the first thing to note is that Stiglitz’s position is quite
contradictory.  In (1994 and 1999a) he stresses that while both competition and private
property are required for a well functioning economy, if a choice has to be made competition
is the more important.  Yet in (1999b) Stiglitz argues that countries that have liberalised fast
have performed worse than those that did so slowly.  How then is competition to be achieved
without liberalisation?  The issue is not addressed directly, but from the texts it seems that,
for Stiglitz, competition is mainly to be achieved by “building up the regulatory framework
for competition” (1999a, p.19).  While such a framework is useful in an economy in which
price, trade and entry controls have been abolished, it is not much use on its own.  Poland
between 1985 and 1989 provides a good example of an economy with a fair degree of de-
monopolisation in manufacturing, which suffered from severe stagnation as a result of
                                                
39 For large and small privatisation (p.10).  The maximum score is 8.
40 The score of early privatisers deteriorates even more on inequality if we define it only by the achievement of a
score of 7 or 8 on the EBRD privatisation index.  But this only transfers Kyrgyzstan to the early group, and
performance on the average change in life expectancy remains high at +0.8.
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ubiquitous controls.
In (1999b) Stiglitz widens his challenge to include criticism of the “excessive and
unwarranted confidence” in the view that early liberalisation and low inflation were, in
addition to rapid privatisation, the “cornerstones of a successful transition policy” (his Theses
19 and 20).  Stiglitz accepts that, according to economic theory, reducing price distortions
through price and trade liberalisation and price stabilisation, in addition to improving
incentives through privatisation, “should have moved countries closer to their production
possibilities curve”.  For Stiglitz, the problem arises since “output should have soared –
instead it plummeted”.  Much of his challenge to the conventional policy prescription is fired
by this apparent contradiction.  However, for us this problem does not arise.  For, as noted
earlier, we associate output falls in the initial phase of transition on the one hand with
inherited structural distortions and wage rigidities, and on the other with institutional crises,
and therefore see these falls as in most part inevitable.  Stiglitz chooses to ignore the fact that,
despite wide differences in reform policies, cumulative falls in industrial output, at 40-60
percent, were not just large but also similar between countries.  He also ignores that, as
Aaslund, Boone and Johnson (1996) first showed, the speed of macroeconomic stabilisation
had a significant effect on the time profile of decline, but had little impact upon the
magnitude of the cumulative fall of output.  Moreover, these falls actually tended to be larger
in the countries which were slow in bringing inflation to moderate levels (say below 50
percent per annum) but we agree that the evidence is too weak to suggest the presence of any
strong causality from higher inflation to larger cumulative output falls.  In any case, apart
from increasing inflation, the main effect of a loose macroeconomic policy was to reduce the
rate of fall of output and, therefore, to extend the length of the transformational recession.
(On this point, see also EBRD’s Transition Report 1999, p.64.)
Stiglitz’s second point is that in transition, where large relative price changes are
required, inflation should not be pushed so low that such changes can only be achieved
through nominal falls in some prices (since nominal prices are said to be sticky downwards).
Reformers’ attempts to eliminate inflation therefore interfered with the dynamic adjustment
of the economy and were misguided.  Whether Stiglitz is right on the downward stickiness of
prices and wages in transition economies or not, he is certainly wrong on what reformers
actually did.  Rightly or wrongly, with one or two exceptions such as Croatia in 1993 and
Bulgaria in 1998, rates of inflation have been reduced relatively gradually, and cumulative
price increases since the beginning of the transition have been more than adequate for the
necessary relative price changes, registering in the hundreds of percent at the least (with the
sole exceptions of the former GDR, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia).
As regards liberalisation, along with EBRD’s Transition Reports, 1995-1999, we
interpret the evidence as supporting the proposition that, in the countries which liberalised
faster, outputs not only stopped falling earlier, but also started to recover earlier, so that rapid
price and trade liberalisation accelerated, but did not magnify, the transformational recession.
11.  Conclusion
The three central gradualist theses which Stiglitz has put forward have been demonstrated to
have either no empirical basis or be contradicted by evidence.  Firstly, protecting the existing
organisational capital of SOEs, and building the restructuring of the economy on it is not vital
for a successful transition – as is shown by the experience of China, CE and the Baltic
countries.  Secondly, privatising initially to insiders - as actually happened in Russia - need
not be an effective mechanism for protecting this organisational capital and enabling
successful enterprise restructuring.  And thirdly, it is new private enterprise which is vital for
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a successful transition and this new private sector can grow very rapidly during transition, as
both the Central European and Chinese cases show.
We also argued that the idea that the new post-Communist economic system should
have been built in such a way as to exploit pre-existing (communitarian) social norms rather
than copying real existing western capitalist institutions is mistaken, since one of the effects
of the total crisis of the old system was that such norms no longer had binding social force
(Section 5)41.  The problem facing governments was anomie, or an absence of the relevant
norms.  As regards asset stripping, we suggested that the relevant question is:  why did it not
happen in Russia in such a way as to re-allocate physical capital to new private firms, while it
did in some other countries, particularly in the Baltic countries and Poland?  We argued that
the key point is the extent to which hard budget constraints are imposed on existing SOEs and
entry costs are lowered for new firms, which means the extent of price stabilisation and price,
entry and trade liberalisation.
What, then, remains of value of Stiglitz’s views on economic transition to capitalism?
Certainly his recommendation of ‘short agency chains’ and the criticism of voucher
privatisation schemes to outsiders which follows (ie the Czech case, but not the Russian one
as he mistakenly asserts).  Also, his support for worker management of SOEs and
privatisation to workers and managers (with, however, the caveat that, as is shown by the
very different Russian and Polish experiences, this will only succeed in those countries where
the existing social norms provide support for such institutions).  Finally, there must be a
minimum legal framework of commercial and property law and law enforcement, without
which markets will not develop and market competition will be very limited.  However,
Stiglitz may have overstated the amount of framework needed because of his tendency to
stress regulation and competition enforcement, rather than the protection of property rights
and the enabling of competition.  Indeed, it seems unlikely that China satisfied Stiglitz’s
requirement for competition enforcement and regulation of markets in the early years of its
transition.
If the Russian transition did not fail for the reasons Stiglitz puts forward, why then did
it not succeed until 1999?  We suggest it was for the very reasons that the Russian reformers
themselves explained - in advance - at the very beginning of the transition.  Stiglitz seems
unaware that there was a fierce debate in Russia during 1991-92 about the sequencing of the
reforms.  On the one hand were those who wanted to start with the hardening of budget
constraints, and the liberalisation of prices, trade and entry, and disinflation, while on the
other were those who argued that SOEs by their very nature could not respond to such
changes in the economic environment, and that therefore privatisation had to come first.  The
Russian reformers and their Western (and Eastern) advisers were in the former camp, the
opponents of reform, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in the
latter42.  The 1992 attempt at budget hardening/disinflation cum liberalisation, the Gaidar
plan, failed because of opposition in the Supreme Soviet and insufficient support from
President Yeltsin43.  It was this failure which impaired macroeconomic stabilisation and
enterprise restructuring, and which led the reformers to switch in the autumn of 1992 to the
‘privatisation first’ strategy which they had previously opposed.
As had been predicted by the reformers themselves, this meant that enterprises were
under less pressure to divest physical assets and labour they did not need, which would have
provided the resources needed by de novo private firms to expand.  The failure to disinflate
and liberalise thoroughly made it hard, both for new firms wishing to set up and old firms
                                                
41 The problem of understanding how the capitalist institutions actually work remained.
42 Because they believed that privatisation would prove either impossible or very slow.
43 The reasons for his appointment of the inflationist Gennadi Gerashchenko as head of the Central Bank of
Russia in June 1992, remain a mystery to this day.
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wishing to restructure, to obtain clear information on relative prices.  The continued practice
of large flows of subsidised credit and entry barriers undermined the credibility of the whole
transition strategy.  In particular, the Russian reforms failed to convince citizens that Russia
is the best place to invest their savings.  A large flight of capital has been the result.44  The
reform strategy adopted also made privatisation for large amounts of cash to foreigners
almost impossible and, through the opaqueness it created, enabled the privatisation of central
bank seignorage revenue on a massive scale, as well as facilitating criminal types of asset
stripping of companies by managers or controlling shareholders (through the lack of
transparency high inflation introduced into company accounts).  By the time disinflation
began to succeed in 1995 many of the destructive processes described by Stiglitz had either
been completed, or had at least begun.
Transition happens in time, hence it is likely to be path dependent and, as Stiglitz
stresses, sequencing therefore matters.  However, the sequencing error which was made in
Russia was not so much, as Stiglitz claims, in placing privatisation before the creation of a
legal, competitive and regulatory framework for market processes, but rather the much more
important error of placing privatisation before liberalisation cum hardening of budget
constraints and disinflation.  In an environment of near hyperinflation, massively distorted
prices and soft budget constraints, the best designed privatisation scheme, occurring in an
environment with the requisite legal structure (commercial and company law) and good
regulatory and competition frameworks, could not have succeeded in allocating firms to
efficient managers who would have successfully restructured them.  On the other hand, as the
Slovak and Croat experiences show, given free markets, predictable prices, hard budget
constraints, and the basics of commercial law, even outrageous degrees of ‘crony
privatisation’ need not lead to the huge disorganisation and social costs experienced in
Russia45.
This sequencing problem is related to what appears to be the most important
difference between Stiglitz and us.  In our understanding of the evidence, most Russian
SOEs, with their immense inherited problems, were not capable of growth whatever the
regulatory framework.  Given the financial, managerial and other constraints, and poor
positive incentives, they were capable merely of defensive restructuring.  In our perspective,
the success of transition depends above all on a rapid creation of conditions – institutional,
legal, microeconomic and macroeconomic – which are conducive to the development and
growth of a new private sector.
The adjustments in policies which Russia adopted in the aftermath of the August 1998
financial crisis are creating the right macroeconomic conditions.  With the exception of some
authors, notably Kornai (1990), the early conventional view probably over-estimated the
positive impact on performance of fast privatisation of SOEs and, by the same token, failed to
appreciate sufficiently the key role that a completely new private sector would play in
recovery and growth.
                                                
44 Russian leaders also wished to keep the pretence of Russia continuing to be a super-power.  Consequently,
several republics of the fSU received large subsidies during the existence of the rouble zone and military
spending has continued at quite a high level.
45  Russia also had greater problems of industrial structure to overcome.  However, Stiglitz does not admit that
Russia faced special idiosyncratic difficulties because of its political, military and economic history.
Furthermore, both Croatia and Slovakia were involved (like Russia) in the dissolution of the states to which they
had belonged.  Also, Slovakia’s industry (like Russia’s) was highly defence dependent, while Croatia was
involved in two serious wars, which Russia was not.
24
References
Aaslund, A. (1999), “Why has Russia’s Economic Transformation been so Arduous?”, World
Bank, ABCDE Conference 1999, Washington D.C.
Aaslund, A., Boone, P. and Johnson, S. (1996), “How to Stabilise:  Lessons From Post-
Communist Countries”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 81(1), pp.217-314.
Blanchflower, D. and Oswald, A. (2000), “Measuring Latent Entrepreneurship Across
Nations”, mimeo, January.
Boone, P. and Horder, J. (1998), “Inflation:  Causes, Consequences and Cures”, in Emerging
from Communism:  Lessons from Russia, China and Eastern Europe, Peter Boone,
Stanislaw Gomulka and Richard Layard, (eds.), MIT Press:  Cambridge, MA.
Coase, R. H., (1937), “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, vol.IV, Nov., pp.386-405.
De Broek, M. and Koen, V. (2000), “The ‘Soaring Eagle’:  Anatomy of the Polish Take-Off
in the 1990s”, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/06, January, Washington D.C.
Dabrowski, M. and Rostowski, J. (1998), “What Went Wrong? The Reasons for the Failure
of Stabilisation in Russia in 1992” in Jacek Rostowski (ed.), Macroeconomic
Instability in Post-Communist Countries, Clarendon Press:  Oxford.
Dabrowski, M. (1999), “Ten Years of the Polish Economic Transition 1989-1999”, paper
prepared for the 5th Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies:  Ten Years of
Transition:   What Have We Learned and What Lies Ahead, June 23-25, Dubrovnik.
EBRD (1995), Transition Report, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development:
London.
EBRD (1999), Transition Report - Ten Years of Transition, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development:  London.
Estrin, S. and Wright, M. (1999), “Corporate Governance in the Former Soviet Union:  An
Overview”, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.27(3), pp.398-421.
Frydman, R., Pistor, K., Rapaczynski, A. and Turkewitz, J. (1996), “Investing in Insider
Dominated Firms:  A Study of Russian Voucher Privatisation Funds” in Corporate
Governance in Central Europe and Russia, Vol.I, Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray and
Andrzej Rapaczynski, (eds.), Central European University Press:  Budapest.
Gomulka, S. (1977), “Slowdown in Soviet Industrial Growth:  1947-75 Reconsidered”,
European Economic Review, vol.10, pp.37-49.
Gomulka, S. (1986), “Soviet Growth Slowdown:  Duality, Maturity and Innovation”,
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1986.
Gomulka, S. (1988), “The Gerschenkron Phenomenon and Systemic Factors in the Post-1975
Growth Slowdown”, European Economic Review, vol.32, pp.451-458.
25
Gomulka, S. (1994), “The Financial Situation of Enterprises and its Impact on Fiscal and
Monetary Policies, Poland 1992-93”, Economics of Transition, vol.2(2), pp.189-208.
Gomulka, S. (1995), “The IMF-Supported Programs of Poland and Russia, 1990-1994:
Principles, Errors and Results”, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.20(3),
pp.316-346.
Gomulka, S. (1998a), “The Polish Model of Transformation and Growth”, Economics of
Transition, vol.6 (1), pp.163-171.
Gomulka, S. (1998b), “Output:  Causes of the Decline and the Recovery”, in Emerging from
Communism:  Lessons from Russia, China and Eastern Europe, Peter Boone,
Stanislaw Gomulka and Richard Layard, (eds.), MIT Press:  Cambridge, MA.
Gray, J. (1995), Enlightenment’s Wake, Routledge:  London and New York, Chapter 5.
Grosfeld, I. and Roland, G. (1996), "Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in Central
European Enterprises", Journal of Transforming Economies and Societies, vol. 3, n. 4,
1996.
International Financial Statistics (1999), International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
Kornai, J. (1990), The Road to a Free Economy, Norton & Company:  New York and
London.
Lipton, D. and Sachs, J. (1990), “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe:  the Case of
Poland”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, Brookings Institute:  Washington
D.C.
McKinnon, R. (1991), The Order of Economic Liberalisation, John Hopkins University
Press:  Baltimore.
Milanovic, B. (1998), Income, Inequality and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to
Market Economy, World Bank:  Washington D.C.
Rostowski, J. (1989), “Market Socialism is not Enough:  Inflation vs. Unemployment in
Reforming Communist Economies”, Communist Economies, vol.I, no.3, Oxford.
Rostowski, J. (1993), “Private Sector Development, Structural Change and Macroeconomic
Stabilization:  the Case of Poland 1988-93”, Discussion Paper No. 159, Centre for
Economic Performance, London School of Economics.
Rostowski, J. (1998), Macroeconomic Instability in Post-Communist Countries, Introduction
to Part I, Jacek Rostowski, Clarendon Press:  Oxford.
Schaffer, M., Bevan, A. and Mochrie, R. (1998), “Bank and Enterprise Restructuring in
Transition Economies”, UN, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of
Europe. No.3.
Stiglitz, J. (1994), “Whither Socialism?”, MIT Press:  Cambridge, MA.
26
Stiglitz, J. (1999a), “Whither Reform?”, Annual Bank Conference on
DevelopmentEconomics, April, Washington D.C.
Stiglitz, J. (1999b), “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodies?”, Annual Bank Conference on
Development Economics – Europe, June, World Bank, Paris.
Wiles, P. (1977), Economic Institutions Compared, p.608, Blackwell:  Oxford.
Woo, W.T. (1998), “Why China Grew”, in Emerging from Communism:  Lessons from
Russia, China and Eastern Europe, Peter Boone, Stanislaw Gomulka and Richard
Layard, (eds.), MIT Press:  Cambridge, MA.
Xu, C. and Zhuang, J. (1999), “Why China Grew:  The Role of Decentralization” in
Emerging from Communism:  Lessons from Russia, China and Eastern Europe, Peter
Boone, Stanislaw Gomulka and Richard Layard, (eds.), MIT Press:  Cambridge, MA.
Yasin, Y. G. (1999), “Defeat or Retreat?  Russia’s Reforms and the Financial Crisis”, mimeo,
Moscow.
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Recent Discussion Papers
470 B. Petrongolo
C. A. Pissarides
Looking Into the Black Box:  A Survey of the Matching
Function
469 W. H. Buiter Monetary Misconceptions
468 A. S. Litwin Trade Unions and Industrial Injury in Great Britain
467 P. B. Kenen Currency Areas, Policy Domains and the
Institutionalization of Fixed Exchange Rates
466 S. Gomulka
J. Lane
A Simple Model of the Transformational Recession Under
a Limited Mobility Constraint
465 F. Green
S. McIntosh
Working on the Chain Gang?  An Examination of Rising
Effort Levels in Europe in the 1990s
464 J. P. Neary R&D in Developing Countries:  What Should Governments
Do?
463 M. Güell Employment Protection and Unemployment in an
Efficiency Wage Model
462 W. H. Buiter Optimal Currency Areas: Why Does the Exchange Rate
Regime Matter?
461 M. Güell Fixed-Term Contracts and Unemployment: An Efficiency
Wage Analysis
460 P. Ramezzana Per Capita Income, Demand for Variety, and International
Trade: Linder Reconsidered
459 H. Lehmann
J. Wadsworth
Tenures that Shook the World: Worker Turnover in Russia,
Poland and Britain
458 R. Griffith
S. Redding
J. Van Reenen
Mapping the Two Faces of R&D: Productivity Growth in a
Panel of OECD Industries
457 J. Swaffield Gender, Motivation, Experience and Wages
456 C. Dougherty Impact of Work Experience and Training in the Current and
Previous Occupations on Earnings: Micro Evidence from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
455 S. Machin Union Decline in Britain
454 D. Marsden Teachers Before the ‘Threshold’
453 H. Gospel
G. Lockwood
P. Willman
The Right to Know: Disclosure of Information for
Collective Bargaining and Joint Consultation
452 D. Metcalf
K. Hansen
A. Charlwood
Unions and the Sword of Justice: Unions and Pay Systems,
Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay
451 P. Martin
H. Rey
Financial Integration and Asset Returns
450 P. Martin
H. Rey
Financial Super-Markets: Size Matters for Asset Trade
449 A. Manning Labour Supply, Search and Taxes
448 S. Nickell
L. Nunziata
Employment Patterns in OECD Countries
447 W. Buiter The Fallacy of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
446 R. Portes
H. Rey
The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows
445 G. Duranton
D. Puga
Nursery Cities: Urban Diversity, Process Innovation and
the Life-Cycle of Products
444 D. Quah UK Phillips Curves and Monetary Policy
443 L. Feinstein The Relative Economic Importance of Academic,
Psychological and Behavioural Attributes Developed in
Childhood
442 D. Quah Cross-Country Growth Comparison: Theory to Empirics
441 D. Quah Internet Cluster Emergence
440 E. Mellander The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Labour Demand and
Skill-Biased Technical Change
439 F. Green
A. Felstead
D. Gallie
Computers are Even More Important than You Thought:
An Analysis of the Changing Skill-Intensity of Jobs
To order a discussion paper, please contact the Publications Unit
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7671     Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk
